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in this article a theoretical conceptualization of the liberalization of the electricity industry is devel- 
oped. Three pure and six mixed coordination systems are identified. The main distinguishing factor 
is the choice of one of three different allocation systems (the price mechanism, voluntary agreement 
and governmental hierarchical authority) as a dominant or additional system. Based on this concep- 
tualization, it is possible to operationalize the concept of liberalization, to distinguish it from the 
notions of privatization and regulation, and to model the relation between different sectoral organ- 
izations and different types of governmental regulation. The classification scheme is illustrated by 
applying it to four countries (the Netherlands, Germany, England and Wales, and France). The con- 
cept turns out to be useful in describing different organizational structures in the electricity indus- 
try, and in specifying the different degrees of liberalization already realized. Different national 
policy priorities are identified, and it is demonstrated that liberalization takes on very different 
meanings in different national settings. By taking account of these national approaches, future liber- 
alization policies can be assessed. Copyright © 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd. 
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In many European countries the electricity industry, tradi- 
tionally dominated by the public sector, is being reformed. 
In these countries asearch for adaptive organizational struc- 
tures is under way to enable the industry to achieve optimal 
performance. The challenge is to find effective and efficient 
ways of integrating the public tasks of the industry with the 
workings of the market. Many of these countries are cur- 
rently developing their own ways of doing this, based on 
the existing structures of their electricity industries. The 
challenge for scientists is to develop concepts which allow 
empirical comparisons between these reforms. In this paper 
we propose just such a conceptualization, based on the the- 
ories of neo- and new institutional economics. I 
The central issue to be tackled is how to conceptualize 
the organizational structure and dynamics of the industry, 
taking into account the utility companies' public tasks. Tra- 
ditionally, public sector dominance of the industry derived 
its legitimacy from these public tasks, but this public sector 
dominance has been questioned for a number of reasons. 2 
Supporters of liberalization policies expect, among other 
benefits, that these will lead to increased economic welfare 
at the macroeconomic level. Whether liberalization will 
have this hypothetical effect is an empirical question, now 
the subject of research in many European countries, includ- 
ing the Netherlands. A necessary first step towards validat- 
ing this hypothesis i to construct a conceptualization a d 
operationalization of liberalization. 
In this paper different categories of organization within 
the electricity industry are constructed in an attempt to de- 
fine a clear conceptual framework for the economic liberal- 
ization of the various ectors of the economy. A conceptual 
framework to cope with the ongoing organizational dy- 
namic of the electricity industry is proposed. The scientific 
tSee for example Eggertsson (1990), North ( 1981 ) and Williamson (1975). 
2In a former publication both authors have dealt extensively with this 
question. See KOnneke el al (1994). (This publication is only available in 
Dutch.) 
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challenge is how to deal simultaneously with both eco- 
nomic and political goals at the conceptual level. Economic 
goals are driven by the process of liberalization, whereas 
political goals are set in order to guarantee the traditional 
public tasks of the electricity industry. How can these dif- 
ferent goals - often perceived to be in conflict with one an- 
other - be integrated in one theoretical framework for 
organizing the electricity industry? This question involves 
not only problems of organizational dynamics, but also 
problems of government regulation. Both problems will be 
dealt with in this paper. 
The paper is structured as follows. The second part deals 
with the concept of public tasks; politicians ee these as the 
main performance targets the electricity industry should 
meet, whatever the structure of the industry. The third part 
offers a conceptualization f the structure of the industry. 
Section four contains different models for this. Based on 
these models we develop, in section five, a first attempt at a 
conceptualization f liberalization. In section six we invest- 
igate the relationship between the structure of the industry 
and government regulation. Application of the conceptual 
framework is illustrated in section seven for the cases of the 
Netherlands, Germany, England and Wales, and France. The 
final part of the paper contains ome concluding remarks. 
(4) 
asset specificity (see, eg Williamson, 1985). This means 
that initial investments in the grid drive their value only 
by virtue of a specific relation between the seller (ie the 
electricity producers) and the buyer (the end consumer 
or a market intermediary). Huge investments have to be 
made prior to any delivery of energy, and consequently 
before any cash flow. If one player decides to withdraw 
his commitment tothe transaction (and he is legally al- 
lowed to do so), the investment costs will be lost, be- 
cause there are no alternative players in the market. 
There may also be an incentive for one player to realize 
quasi-rents. These asset-specific investments are con- 
sidered to be very risky in the absence of public inter- 
vention; public dominance is legitimized in the interests 
of reducing investment risks, and securing the develop- 
ment of an effective nationwide infrastructure. As a re- 
suit, public intervention i effect regulates entrance to 
the grid. 
Electricity cannot easily be stored. To guarantee the 
technical and economic integrity of the system, supply 
and demand continually have to be kept in balance, 
whatever the actual delivery conditions, public inter- 
ference is legitimized in the interests of securing an un- 
interrupted supply of electricity. 
The concept of public task 
The public tasks of an industry can be defined as those as- 
pects of the performance of an industry or of companies 
that serve a set of public goals as defined by politicians, and 
often enforced by governmental regulation. 3 Traditionally, 
public involvement in the electricity industry is motivated 
by two types of arguments: economic and political. 
The economic argument results upon a perceived market 
failure in the electricity industry, and is based on a number 
of economic and technical observations. 
(i) Electricity is a basic good that cannot easily be substi- 
tuted by other sources of energy. Given a very low price 
elasticity, market procurement of this good can easily 
result in suppliers behaving as monopolies. Public dom- 
inance is legitimized in the interests of securing a con- 
stant, safe and efficient supply of electricity for the 
nation without monopolistic pricing and investment. 
(2) The production, transport and distribution of electricity 
are assumed to be natural monopolies. In the past, the 
industry was claimed to be a classic example of the per- 
sistence of economies of scale; because of cost advant- 
ages, national or regional utilities were allowed to enjoy 
monopoly positions in order to avoid welfare decreas- 
ing competitive investments. 
(3) The supply of electricity is technically dependent upon 
highly specialized infrastructure: the transport and dis- 
tribution grid. The development of this technical infras- 
tructure is characterized bya very high degree of capital 
The second set of arguments supporting public dominance 
of the electricity industry are politically motivated. Many 
countries, even within the European Union, have a strong 
national interest in securing an independent supply of en- 
ergy, thus avoiding a reliance upon foreign utilities. A safe 
and continuous supply of energy is a precondition for steady 
and prosperous economic development. For this reason, 
countries in Europe, and elsewhere, support and protect a 
strong national electricity industry. 
The public dominance of the industry is also legitimized 
for socioeconomic reasons, in particular to support national 
industries. In Germany and the United Kingdom special 
regulatory arrangements 4 have been used to stimulate the 
burning of domestic oal for generating electricity. In the 
Netherlands availability of national natural gas reserves 
forms one of the premises of national electricity production 
planning; gas fired power stations make up a significant 
part of the total generating capacity, partly as a result of po- 
litical decisions. The Dutch government also fixed the price 
of electricity for nationally important industries, such as 
greenhouse market gardening, and the aluminium and 
chemical industries. The desired production techniques 
may be supported by stimulating appropriate t chnological 
innovations, for example the development ofnuclear power 
in France. After Chernobyl, the Dutch government decided 
to build no more nuclear power stations, which in turn af- 
fected national scientific research in this area. Electricity 
pricing is also used as an instrument of social policy, for 
3However, regulation is not always necessary to ensure the fulfilment of 
public tasks. 
4A classic example is the German Kohlep[ennig, anadditional tax on elec- 
tricity consumption to subsidize the burning of German coal, making the 
price of German coal double the world market price. 
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example by fixing low tariffs to protect low income groups, 
or to pursue a social disconnection policy for defaulters. 5 
Finally, the national electricity industry is an important 
provider of employment. 
Environmental protection has recently been added to the 
electricity industry's list of public tasks. Without techno- 
logical innovation, the large-scale generation and supply of 
electricity may have a significant impact on the natural en- 
vironment. Reducing emissions from large-scale power sta- 
tions has been part of Dutch environmental policy since the 
1970s; improving fuel efficiency, the political choice of the 
mix of fuels to be burned, and energy saving measures, 
have been introduced as new environmentally motivated 
goals for the electricity industry. In the Netherlands, the 
government and the industry have also agreed to achieve 
significant reduction in energy consumption. To meet hese 
targets, the distributors will have to encourage consumers 
to use less electricity. 
To summarize, the perceived market failure of the elec- 
tricity industry has given rise to four main public tasks. 
First, protecting the consumer by providing electricity at 
low tariffs, and guaranteeing both quality and safety. Sec- 
ond, the assumed persistence of economies of scale in pro- 
duction, transport and distribution. Third, management of
the grid to guarantee that investors recover their costs, and 
to ensure that the grid remains accessible to players in the 
industry. Fourth, safeguarding supply by maintaining a bal- 
ance between economic and technical forces. Besides these 
economic arguments, ocioeconomic and environmental 
arguments are used to legitimize public dominance of the 
industry. 
It must be stressed that these public tasks are likely to 
change. Because of technical developments, economies of 
scale in production are less persistent than we thought only 
a decade ago; small-scale lectricity generation technolo- 
gies have been developed that can already compete in terms 
of efficiency with big power stations. The degree of asset 
specificity of the grid is declining as the density of the grid 
and the number of players connected to it increase. Further- 
more, socioeconomic preferences have changed, as has the 
political will to use electricity tarifl~ and investments a  in- 
struments of social and economic policy. 
However, to explore the potential for liberalizing the 
electricity industry, it is necessary to account for these dif- 
ferent categories of public tasks. Liberalization might affect 
these public tasks because they would then not be guaran- 
teed by government regulation; a careful trade offhas to be 
made between the political and economic desirability of en- 
forcing these public tasks by government regulation in a 
liberal market. Liberalization is expected to enhance co- 
nomic performance, whereas regulation appears to empha- 
size carrying out the public tasks. As a consequence, the 
structure of the electricity industry and the involvement of 
public authorities are strongly related, as evidenced by the 
link between liberalization and public tasks. To disentangle 
5Examples ofthis type of public involvement can be found in Belgium. 
Table I Characteristicsofbasic coordinating sysiems a 
Coordinating Unit of Mechanism Dominani 
mechanism decision making of allocation economic goal 
Market Individual Price setting Individual profitability 
and continuity 
Network Group Agreement Collective profitability 
and continuity 
ltierarchy Public authority Directive National public interest 
"The coordinating mechanisms are treated as Weberian "ideal types" in 
order to cope conceptually with organizational dynamics. 
this conceptuality, we first deal with each concept sepa- 
rately. In the next two sections, organizational models are 
proposed which cope with the concept of liberalization. 
The concept of government regulation is then discussed, 
and both concepts then brought ogether. 
Bas ic  mode ls  o f  o rgan izat ion  in the  e lec t r i c i ty  
indust ry  
Two steps are necessary in order to cope conceptually with 
the static and dynamic organization of the electricity indus- 
try. First, to define the basic mechanisms underlying the co- 
ordination of economic activities: and second to elaborate 
upon the structural features of the electricity industry. At 
the basic analytical evel three systems for coordinating 
economic activities can be distinguished: markets, net- 
works and hierarchies (Thompson et al, 1994: Dahl and 
Lindblom, 1953: Dahl, 1982). These systems differ from 
each other in three fundamental ways: 
(I) the mechanism of economic decision making: 
(2) the mechanism ofallocatiom and 
(3) the goals of economic activities. 
Table I lists these differences between the three systems. 
In a market system decision making is completely indi- 
vidualized. Individual players, motivated by self-interest, 
are autonomous decision makers regarding their consump- 
tion and production of goods and services. The neoclassical 
price theory models this individual decision process with 
great formal elegance. Price setting governs the system, in 
which individual players compete against each other to 
achieve individual economic goals. 
The network is characterized by a voluntary collective 
decision process among a group of players. Although all 
the players have identical property rights with respect o 
certain economic goods, none of them is able to change or 
capitalize their bundle of property rights without the ap- 
proval of the other members of the group. In a network, 
players decide to cooperate voluntarily; planning by con- 
sensus becomes the primary mechanism for allocating 
goods and services. In this system, competition i the market 
system is replaced by consensus building, which reduces 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by individual decision 
makers. The economic goals of a group can be described as 
collective profitability and continuity. 
The third mechanism for coordinating economic activity 
is public authority. Here the decision mechanism is based on 
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the presence of a public authority forcing the players to 
operate the system according to certain directives. Goods 
and services are allocated by a publicly dominated system of 
planning; the dominant economic goal being not individual 
or collective profitability, but the public interest. The elec- 
tricity industry in European countries has traditionally been 
dominated by this third mechanism of hierarchical location. 
At the level of basic economic institutions, reforming 
the electricity industry in European countries may be per- 
ceived a choice for or against a specific oordinating mech- 
anism. In theory, all activities may be coordinated by one 
mechanism; in reality, though, all three coordinating mech- 
anisms exist simultaneously in the electricity industry, al- 
though at any moment in time one of them is dominant. At 
the basic level, the actual reforms may be perceived as sim- 
ply adding one or two more coordinating mechanisms to 
the dominant mechanism in order to facilitate economic 
transactions and other activities. This is what actually hap- 
pens in many European countries; two or three mechanisms 
simultaneously coordinate transactions in order to bring 
about reform. On a theoretical level, industrial economic 
structures can be described as mixtures of different coordi- 
nation systems, one of them being dominant. This results in 
a conceptualization with one dominating coordination sys- 
tem, to which, in the simplest case, one other system is 
added, giving nine different systems of coordination. This 
is illustrated in Table 2. 
Each mixed model can be characterized asfollows: 
(I) In the coordinated free market he price setting mecha- 
nism is combined with specific agreements between 
market players, such as agreements on prices and mar- 
ket shares. An example of this kind of agreement in a 
market system is the cartel. 
(2) In the controlled free market he autonomy of individual 
players is partly restricted by public authority, for ex- 
ample the right to export electricity, or to enter the grid. 
(3) The liberalized coordination is characterized bya set of 
agreements partly implemented by the price setting 
mechanism, for example contracting out new generat- 
ing capacity in the electricity industry. 
(4) In a system of controlled coordination the public au- 
thority prescribes the norms and standards of the sys- 
tem which are to be attained by the players themselves, 
through consensus and agreement. An example of con- 
trolled coordination is the approval required from the 
Dutch government for the electricity plan made by the 
Dutch electricity production organization (Sep). 
(5) The liberalized hierarchy uses the price mechanism in a 
system dominated by a public authority. An example of 
this coordinating mechanism is the application of price 
adjustments between the various divisions of a state 
dominated electricity company. 
(5) The coordinated hierarchy is a system dominated by a 
public authority in which the players are allowed to de- 
cide certain issues themselves; an example in France is 
the agreement between EDF and GDF to open up new 
distribution areas. 
Table 2 Pure and mixed systems for coordinating economic activities 
Added Dominant coordinating mechanism 
coordinating Price Agreement Public 
mechanism authority 
Price Full.free Liberalized Liberalized 
market coordination hierarchy 
Agreement Coordinated Full Coordinated 
free market coordination hierarchy 
Public authority Controlled Controlled Full 
free market coordination hierarchy 
It is theoretically possible to identify more organizational 
models, for example by defining not one but two additional 
mechanisms next to the dominant coordinating mechanism. 
However, this procedure is theoretically so complex that it 
becomes difficult to handle. In order to empirically under- 
stand the current reforms in European countries - as a first 
step towards operationalizing the economic structure of in- 
dustrial sectors - it will be sufficient o concentrate on the 
theoretical extension of the models listed in Table 2. 
By adding other structural features, the nine basic mod- 
els can be expanded conceptually to cope with the empiri- 
cal complexity of the organization of the electricity 
industry. However, adding more structural features does not 
affect the organizational c assification in Table 2. At the 
conceptual level, models of sector organization cannot cope 
with political preferences for the structure of an industrial 
sector, so, in the next section, we expand the nine basic 
models by adding some structural features that seem to be 
relevant o the electricity industry. The extended models 
cope with structural features which may be significant for 
specifying the conditions impinging upon the organization 
of the industry. Our frame of reference is the neoclassical 
idea of the structure--conduct-performance paradigm, and 
neo-institutional economic theory. 
Extended models of organization in the 
electricity industry 
The structure of industrial sectors of the economy, such as 
the electricity industry, often displays many, rather complex 
features. In order to cope theoretically with this complexity 
it is necessary to specify some basic structural elements of 
the economic organization i the nine systems of coordina- 
tion. The structural features we propose are based on a mix- 
ture of theoretical insights from different economic theories. 
The significance of these features and their different effects 
is discussed briefly in the following sections. Based on these 
features, the extended models are elaborated. 
Entrance restrictions 
Roughly speaking, three different types of entrance restric- 
tions can be identified: 
(1) natural barriers to entry caused by certain cost struc- 
tures (economies of scale, economies of scope, learning 
effects, or geographically defined cost advantages); 
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(2) artificial restrictions resulting from strategies adopted 
by the players; 
(3) artificial restrictions authorized by the public authority. 
The importance of restrictions to entry is emphasized in tra- 
ditional (neo)classical economic literature on industrial or- 
ganization. Traditional neoclassical theories identify 
different types of markets, such as full competition, monop- 
olies and oligopolies, by distinguishing between the actual 
degrees of entry by competitors. In Baumol's theory of con- 
testable markets - a different approach - the potential for 
entrance by new players under certain circumstances is as- 
sumed to influence conomic behaviour (Baumol, 1982). In 
addition, entrance barriers have been a focal point of ana- 
lysis in recent publications about he dynamic aspects of in- 
dustrial organization (Baldwin, 1995). 
The need lor inJormation 
Economic allocation processes often take place on the basis 
of incomplete and asymmetric information. Neo-institu- 
tional economic theories deal with the impact of incom- 
plete information on the allocation of economic goods. 6As 
it is theoretically elaborated by principal agent heory and 
the transaction cost approach, economic transaction pro- 
cesses are strongly influenced by the availability of infor- 
mation and its distribution among the various players. 
Neoclassical markets assume ahigh degree of transparency. 
In the case of incomplete information, or information 
asymmetry, specific ontractual rrangements are needed to 
reduce economic risks. Pechman (1993) demonstrates that 
the management of information flows is an important fea- 
ture of the organization of the electricity industry. He ar- 
gues that market power in this industry is based, among 
other things, on thc control of relevant information flows. 
Power pools can turn out to be information cartels, and in- 
formation asymmetry makes these difficult o control, even 
by public regulators (Pechman, 1993, pp 68, 69): 
the utility, by creating organisations that are beyond astate 
regulatory commission's control, is able to control informa- 
tion required for effective regulation and the development of 
efficient markets. The vehicle by which utilities gain this 
market power is what I call an infomaation cartel. 
It can be argued that different institutional settings can be 
identified by the way they handle the need for information 
of economic players. Generally, three different cases can be 
identified: 
(l) full transparency; 
(2) information asymmetry is dealt with by voluntary ex- 
change of information; 
(3) information asymmetry is dealt with by (public) control. 
GoveJvlance slrtlclures 
Williamson (1985) distinguishes four different ypes of 
governance structures: 
(1) Market governance: all relevant transaction parameters 
are known to the players, and there are no transaction 
specific investments. This is a situation characterized 
by little or no uncertainty, and economic activities can 
be organized by spot market ransactions. 
(2) Trilateral governance: uncertainties about the future 
state of the world are significant, and players are also 
engaged in asset specific investments, which increases 
economic risks. In this situation, pure market arrange- 
ments are not satisfactory because of the threat of op- 
portunistic behaviour by third parties which seek to 
realize quasi-rents. 7 This uncertainty can be dealt with 
by 'third party assistance (arbitration) in resolving dis- 
putes and evaluating performance' (Williamson, 1985, 
p 75). By incorporating this third party assistance in a 
contractual rrangement, transactions can be made in 
the marketplace. In the electricity market an independ- 
ent regulator might operate like third party assistance, 
facilitating contractual rrangements within a market 
regime. 
(3) Bilateral governance: a specialized governance struc- 
ture in which the participating players retain their eco- 
nomic autonomy in a situation characterized by a high 
degree of asset-specific nvestment and uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1985, p 75). Transactions take place in a 
market regime, but specific bilateral contractual ar- 
rangements have to be made to cope with the possibility 
of opportunistic behaviour. Players adopt long-term bi- 
lateral contractual rrangements which, if necessary, 
are subject o permanent revision. Because both market 
parties are locked into the transaction by specific in- 
vestments, none of them has the opportunity to take ad- 
vantage of the dependency ofthe other. For example, in 
the liberalized Norwegian electricity market a substan- 
tial number of producers, distributors, and traders con- 
tinued their relationship with their traditional 
contracting partners alter liberalization; even spot mar- 
ket prices remained significantly different from the con- 
tract prices. An explanation might be that both market 
parties had built up a high degree of mutual asset spe- 
cific knowledge and confidence, which would be lost 
when changing contract partners. 
(4) Unified governance: hierarchical coordination of eco- 
nomic activities by vertical integration. Unified gover- 
nance is transaction cost efficient in a situation 
characterized by highly asset specific investment, in
combination with a high degree of uncertainty. Al- 
though this unified governance is often achieved in 
6A good overview of this theoretical approach is given by Eggertsson, 
1OO0. 
7Quasi-rents are economic surpluses which are captured from other actors 
as a consequence of dependencies causcd by asset-specific investments; 
see Williamson ( I 0:q5 ). 
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Table 3 Different market based organizational models 
Market model Full Coordinated Controlled 
features free market free market free market 
Allocation mechanism Price setting Price setting Price setting 
supplemented byagreement supplemented by 
public authority 
Dominant unit of decision making 
Goal of economic activity 
Entry restrictions 
Information eeds 
Contractual relations 
Ownership structure 
International trade 
No restrictions 
Full transparency 
Market governance 
h~dividual player 
hldividual pro[itabili O, and contimdty 
Restrictions by agreement 
h![brmation asymmeoy 
Bilateral governance 
Artificial restrictions 
by public authority 
Trilateral governance 
Private property Common property Public proper O, 
Restricted by Restricted by 
agreement public authority 
Open borders 
private sector firms, we will concentrate in this article 
on the specific ase of unified governance enforced and 
controlled by a public authority. 
Ownership 
Property rights theory literature suggests that the structure 
of ownership influences economic performance and alloca- 
tion processes. 8 Generally, three different ypes of owner- 
ship structures can be identified: 
(I) private ownership, in which all relevant aspects of prop- 
erty rights are held by private players; 
(2) common ownership, in which a group of private players 
takes the relevant allocation decisions, for example in 
an industrial cartel; 
(3) state ownership, in which a public authority controls all 
allocation decisions, which in turn might be under polit- 
ical control. 
In the discussion about restructuring European electricity 
markets the change from state ownership to private owner- 
ship is a recurrent issue. 
International trade 
Granting possibilities for international trade between indi- 
vidual electricity producers, distributors, and traders is as- 
sumed to stimulate fficiency in the industry: allowing 
international trade threatens the monopoly position of na- 
tional traders in electricity. Three different possibilities can 
be identified: (1) autarky; (2) restricted foreign trade; and 
(3) unrestricted foreign trade. 
The extended models 
Some structural features are partly assumed, such as in- 
formation eeds and the persistence of natural or artificial 
barriers to entry. Other features can be interpreted as the re- 
sult of economic behaviour under certain conditions, such 
as ownership structures and various contractual relations. 
The persistence of barriers to entry can also be interpreted 
as the result of specific strategies adopted by economic 
8A classic overview article is De Alessi (1980). 
players. Although this list of features of the economic order 
is both known and well accepted in the literature, it would 
appear that there is no coherent theoretical foundation. We 
believe that our categorization f different systems of coor- 
dination, as presented in the preceding section, might be a 
first step towards filling this theoretical gap. 
The structural features mentioned above can serve to de- 
fine our nine models of organization. The first set of organi- 
zational models is based on the market as the dominant 
coordinating mechanism. The three different market ori- 
ented coordination systems may be defined by these addi- 
tional features, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 lists the three market based organizational mod- 
els, which are defined logically according to the structural 
features discussed above. The dominant allocating mechan- 
ism is price-setting, combined with voluntary agreements 
(the network approach) in the coordinated free market, or 
public regulation (the hierarchy approach) in the controlled 
free market. Because of the dominance of the price mech- 
anism, the individual player is the basic unit of decision 
making. In a coordinated free market, decisions made by 
individual players are conditioned by agreements with other 
players, or by public regulation if the free trade market is 
controlled. The same holds true for the economic goals of 
the system; individual profitability and continuity is domin- 
ant, but is conditioned by agreements in a coordinated free 
market, and by public regulation in a controlled free mar- 
ket. The wider scope of the italicized cells in Table 3 indi- 
cates where it is not possible to link the features to specific 
economic regimes. For example, public ownership may 
occur in all three types of market based organizational mod- 
els; even a full free (neoclassical) market can function with 
public sector economic players, in case their economic 
goals are determined entirely by profitability and individual 
continuity. Other additional features appear to have similar 
'degrees of freedom' with respect to the different economic 
systems. Because of this ambiguity, the different organiza- 
tion models of the electricity industry can only serve as ex- 
amples of industrial organization, in which the various 
structural features display a certain theoretical logic. 
The network and authority based models can be defined 
in the same way - see Tables 4 and 5. In both tables the 
cells have been logically defined. 
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Table 4 Different network based organizational models 
Network model Liberalized Full Controlled 
features coordination coordination coordination 
Allocation mechanism Agreement, supplemented Agreement 
by price setting 
Dominant unit of decision making 
Goal of economic activity 
Entry restrictions 
Inlbrmation eeds 
Contractual relations 
Ownership structure 
International trade 
Agreement, supplemented by
public authority 
Grou D 
Collective pro[itahili O, and continui(v 
Restrictions hv agreement 
Full transparency Voluntary intbrmation exchange 
Artificial restrictions by public 
authority 
Enforced intormation exchange 
Trilateral governance Market govermmce Bilateral governance 
Private proper O, Common Property 
Restricted by agreement 
Public properO: 
Restricted by public authority 
Table 5 Different hierarchical organizational models 
Hierarchy model Liberalized Controlled Full 
features hierarchy hierarchy hierarchy 
Allocation mechanism Public authority, supplemented Public authority, supplemented Public authority 
by price setting by agreement 
Dominant unit of decision making Public authori(v 
Goal of economic activity 
Entry restrictions Controlled entrance [ 
based on ottlpUt based on agrecnl(qll 
Information eeds Voluntary information exchange I 
Contractual relations ___ Unified governa 
Ownership structure 
International trade 
Public interest 
Transparency, where price 
setting is employed 
Bilateral contracting 
Private proper(v 
Trilateral contracting 
Common proper O' 
Artilicial restrictions by public 
authority 
Enforced information exchange 
nce 
Puhlic property 
Restricted I~v puhlic aulhori O, 
In the network based models the group is the dominant 
unit of decision making, allowing price setting mechanisms 
to be agreed upon voluntarily by the group in a system of 
liberalized coordination. In a system of controlled coordina- 
tion voluntary agreement by the group is conditioned by 
public regulation. Again, the italicized cells represent fea- 
tures which cannot be uniquely attributed to just one of the 
organizational models. 
In the authority based models, the public authority is the 
dominant unit of decision making, allowing price setting in 
a liberalized hierarchy, or voluntary agreement in a coordina- 
ted hierarchy as additional coordinating mechanisms. 
It appears to be difficult to attribute the features peci- 
fied in the extended organizational models to one specific 
regime; they even show up in very different institutional 
settings. For example, publicly enforced 'entry restrictions' 
appear in controlled free markets, controlled coordinations, 
and full hierarchies. Contractual relations, which can be the 
same in different dominant coordination mechanisms, are 
another good example. If empirical comparisons between 
different national institutional regimes are only based on 
these criteria they become rather fussy; the advantage of 
our classification scheme is that we are able to theoretically 
define a distinctive criterion for the identification of differ- 
ent coordination systems. 
The concept of liberalization 
Using the models of sector organization it is possible to de- 
fine the concept of liberalization as: 
(1) 
(2) 
a change in the dominant coordination system from 
hierarchy to network, or from network to price mech- 
anism; and/or 
a change in the additional coordination system - which 
a constant dominant coordination system - from hier- 
archy to network, or from network to price mechanism. 
Changes in additional coordination systems can be opera- 
tionalized as a change in some additional feature of the organ- 
ization of the sector. A change in the dominant coordination 
system results in a completely new organizational model of 
the sector. 
Table 2 illustrates the principle underlying both types of 
liberalization. The first type is illustrated by a change in the 
dominant coordinating mechanism from the top right to the 
top left of the table (from public authority, via agreement, 
to price). The second type of liberalization, represented 
vertically, illustrates the dynamic from the bottom to the 
top of each column. 
Distinguishing between these two types of liberalization 
allows us to understand the processes of liberalization i  re- 
lation to the actual structure of the electricity industry in 
different countries. Take, for instance, the Netherlands and 
France. The actual structure of the Dutch electricity indus- 
try can be described as a system of 'controlled coordina- 
tion' because agreement is dominant, but strongly 
conditioned by the public sector. Dutch liberalization may 
result in a system of'full  coordination', or even 'liberalized 
coordination'. In France the actual structure of the electric- 
ity industry can be described as a system of 'full hierarchy'; 
548 Economic organization and liberalization O['the lectricity indusoy: M J Arentsen and R W Kiinneke 
here, liberalization may result in a system of 'coordinated 
hierarchy', or 'liberalized hierarchy'. So, in both countries 
the direction of liberalization is the same, but the kind of 
liberalization is quite different, owing to differences in the 
organizational structure of the industry. We look at these 
examples in more detail below. 
Organizational models and styles of 
government regulation 
With the exception of the pure hierarchial model, all mod- 
els of industrial organization are, to a certain degree, lib- 
eral. However, the real potential for liberalization is 
theoretically determined by two related factors: the eco- 
nomic and technological limits of electricity as a good, and 
national political decision making. For example, the scope 
for trading in electricity is restricted by accessibility to the 
grid, which is not only a matter of economic rationale, but 
also of political choice. Both these factors can only be 
partly included in the theoretical discussion, because the 
actual organizational structure will always be partly deter- 
mined by political considerations. 
The question of the possibilities for liberalizing the elec- 
tricity industry can therefore be recast o address the con- 
tent and scope of government regulation. Only in the pure 
hierarchical model are the structure, functioning and per- 
formance of the industry completely determined and con- 
trolled by public authority, the two coinciding almost 
entirely. In the other eight models the content and scope of 
public authority is ultimately a matter of political choice. 
The question which then arises is: whether the relationship 
between industrial organization and government regulation 
can be specified at the conceptual level. We think it can, if 
the basic assumption about he role of the public authority 
in different organizational models is taken as the starting 
point. It will be argued that the type of government regula- 
tion is determined by the type of industrial organization. 
Let us start with the pure models of industrial organization. 
In a full free market he role of the public authority is 
subordinate to that of other players in the industry; the full 
free market is dominated by individual exchange relations 
between equivalent players. These relations hould not be 
affected by government regulation, because this would dis- 
rupt the functioning of the free market. So, for this reason 
the public authority is subordinated tothe other actors. In a 
system of full coordination the role of the public authority 
is equivalent to that of the other players; agreement be- 
tween players, of which the public authority is one, is the 
dominant organizing principle. In such a system, the au- 
thority is free to make agreements with other players. In a 
system of full hierarchy the public authority is in a domin- 
ant position to the other players in the industry; the public 
authority is able to enforce its will. 
The type of industrial organization, therefore, deter- 
mines the role of the public authority, and it can be assumed 
that this role dictates the style of public regulation. The 
style of public regulation can be defined by the degree of 
coerciveness; in a pure hierarchical organization the style of 
regulation is coercive by definition, whereas in a neoclass- 
ical free market he style of regulation works to keep the 
level of coercion to a minimum. Three basic styles of regu- 
lation can be identified in order to theoretically define the 
scope of regulation in each organizational model. 9
(!) The facilitating style: the government only lays down 
conditions for the functioning of the electricity industry. 
(2) The initiating style: the government encourages the in- 
dustry to develop in a certain direction. 
(3) The enforcing style: the government forces the industry 
to develop in a certain direction. 10 
In theory, a public authority does not have to take its role 
within a sector of the economy into account when setting 
regulations. In all three roles, facilitating, initiating and en- 
forcing styles are all possible. However, to achieve ffective 
regulation the public authority must choose a style of regu- 
lation which matches its actual role; so, the relationship be- 
tween its role and its style of regulation is characterized 
more by probability than by inevitability. 
The style of government regulation, like industrial or- 
ganization, may be dynamic. Depending upon whether the 
level of coercion is decreasing or increasing, two main 
types of change may be observed: (1) deregulation, from 
enforcing to facilitating; and (2) reregulation, from facilitat- 
ing to enforcing. 
The style of government regulation can be identified by 
the object of government regulation. Taking the neoclassi- 
cal structure--conduct-performance p radigm as a starting 
point, both the structure and the conduct of the industry are 
perceived to be the objects of government regulation. The 
performance of the sector can be interpreted as the result of 
regulating structure and/or performance. 
The structure of industrial organization, as an object, has 
been elaborated upon in previous parts of this paper. The 
following structural features can be regulated: 
(1) the mechanism of allocation; 
(2) entrance restrictions; 
(3) contractual relations; 
(4) ownership; 
(5) access to the market. 
As an object of government regulation, conduct concerns 
the production of electricity: here, regulation may influence 
the fuel mix, production technologies, the environmental 
impacts of electricity generation, the security of supply, and 
tariffs. It also concerns transport and distribution: here, reg- 
ulation controls transport, echnical delivery, entrance con- 
ditions to the grid, and tariffs. Regulation affects trading in 
electricity, security of supply, environmental management 
by the end users, tariffs, and the conditions governing im- 
port and export. These are just some examples of conduct 
9Actually, coerciveness should be viewed as a continuum, allowing more 
than three 'positions' torepresent different s yles of regulation. 
IOThese styles of regulation are a variation on the typology often proposed 
in the literature. See, for example, Mitnick (1980). 
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Table 6 Industrial organization and regulation 
Industrial Dominant style Dominant object 
organization of regulation of regulation 
Full free market Facilitating Structure 
Coordinated market 
Controlled market 
Liberalized coordination Facilitating and Conduct 
initiating 
Full coordination 
Controlled coordination 
Liberalized hierarchy Facilitating, Structure and 
initiating and conduct 
en[brcing 
Coordinated hierarchy 
Strict hierarchy 
regulation, which could be described and expanded upon in 
more detail. 
Theoretically, the object of government regulation con- 
sists of the structure and economic activities of the electric- 
ity industry: production, transport/distribution, a d trade. In 
reality these activities are often recognized as being subsec- 
tors of the electricity industry, each displaying different op- 
portunities for liberalization, and are consequently distinct 
objects of  government regulation. 
The theoretical relationship between industrial organiza- 
tion on the one hand, and the style and object of regulation 
on the other hand, can be specified theoretically, as shown 
in Table 6. 
It should be noted that in Table 6 the organizational 
models are related to the dominant style of regulation and 
object of regulation. The relationship is a hypothetical one, 
based on theoretical rather than empirical arguments. In or- 
ganizations dominated by the price mechanism, govern- 
ment can only take on a facilitating role by guaranteeing 
certain structural preconditions for the autonomous func- 
tioning of  the market. In these market based models the pri- 
mary objective is to optimize the functioning of  the free 
market, which is only possible because the market players' 
motives are primarily economic. 
In the network based models the primary objective is to 
optimize self-governance within the group by facilitating 
and initiating voluntary agreement and cooperation. Be- 
sides a facilitating style of regulation - the organizational 
structure being the primary objective - it may be appropri- 
ate to initiate certain developments. For example, a change 
in organizational structure might lead to a new working 
stye within the self-governing roup. 
Public dominance in the hierarchy models makes the 
choice of regulation style in'elevant in these cases; the pub- 
lic authority can do what it likes, always being able to en- 
force its will upon the industry. 
reorganization of the industry, and to determine different 
possible future directions of the liberalization process. To 
illustrate this, the cases of the Netherlands, Germany, Eng- 
land and Wales, and France will be subjected to our ex- 
tended models of coordination regimes. This description is 
only very brief, and is intended to demonstrate the possibil- 
ities for comparing the different styles of liberalization in 
these countries. A more detailed analysis is needed, and is 
the subject of a new research project. 
The Netherlands 
The current structure of the industry I1 can be described as 
controlled coordination - a regime dominated by agree- 
ments, with public authority supplying an additional co- 
ordination system. Producers and distributors cooperate 
mainly by mutual agreement, but some important features 
of the Dutch electricity market are brought about by gov- 
ernment regulation. 
Market entrance There are entrance restrictions for 'elec- 
tricity only' producers. Among other more technical regu- 
lations, producers must provide a minimum of  at least 2.5 
MW installed capacity. However, there are no entrance re- 
strictions to the decentralized electricity generation market 
for distributors (up to 25 MW), and to companies in other 
industries which also generate lectricity (without an upper 
capacity limit). Distribution and trading in electricity is 
strictly regulated by public permits. 
hz[brmation exchange The exchange of  information is 
mainly voluntary, although this is to a certain extent com- 
pelled by the Electricity Act, which stipulates the pooling 
of electricity generation. Distribution and trading in elec- 
tricity is regulated by a system of maximum tariffs nego- 
tiated between the industry and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, and both prices and the service offered by the vari- 
ous traders are highly transparent. 12Investments in generat- 
ing capacity and transmission lines (as far as 'electricity 
only' producers are concerned) are coordinated by a na- 
tional planning system, and set down in the biennial elec- 
tricity plan (Electriciteitsplan). This electricity plan is 
agreed by the electricity industry and has to be approved by 
the central government. Decentralized capacity (mainly in- 
dustrial CHP) is not included in this system of national 
planning. 
Ownership Ownership lies with the public sector: although 
almost all electricity utilities are legally private corpora- 
tions, the shareholders are all public authorities. Contrac- 
tual relations are trilateral, or even unified, because core 
Nat iona l  l ibera l i za t ion  programmes 
The classification scheme developed in this article can be 
used to analyse different national liberalization pro- 
grammes. As we shall demonstrate in this section, it is pos- 
sible to identify different national priorities in the 
I lFor a more detailed escription ofthe legal structure of tile Dutch elec- 
tricity market see Huygen (I 995). The description of the Dutch case is 
based on the market structure as before the publication of a policy note of 
the Dutch government for a further liberalization fthis sector (Derde En- 
ergienota, 1996). The consequences of this policy note are not clear at the 
date of submission ofthis article. 
12An exception being the tariffs for giant industrial consumers. 
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contractual parameters (like tariffs) are determined cen- 
trally by the pool. 
International O'ade The national pool (Sep) in effect dom- 
inates international trade, although legally only distributors 
are excluded from international trade. 
The present system for coordinating the Dutch electric- 
ity industry is an interesting combination of a network 
dominated approach - supplemented by governmental 
control (and therefore classified as 'controlled coordina- 
tion') - and elements of competition between central, 'elec- 
tricity only' generating companies and decentralized 
producers. During the last few years it has become vident 
that this gives rise to an unstable institutional framework. 
Decentralized CHP has proved to be very competitive com- 
pared to the traditional, large-scale producers and has, un- 
expectedly, gained a market share of more than 20%, 
leaving the central generating utilities with the costs con- 
comitant with increasing excess capacity. Whereas the re- 
forms were initiated to improve coordination between the 
various players in the industry and the supervision of gov- 
ernment, the introduction of a less regulated market niche 
for decentralized production resulted in an unstable indus- 
trial organization. Two possible developments might occur. 
First, 'l iberalized coordination' could be introduced to 
maintain the network based regime, while at the same time 
introducing some price-coordinated elements, such as 
price-based competition for new generating capacity and 
competition for distribution area franchises. However, to 
stabilize this regime institutionally, decentralized genera- 
tion would have to be integrated into the national electricity 
plan. Second, the dominant coordination system could be 
transformed into a price-led system of allocation. A coordi- 
nated free market would fit well into the Dutch tradition, in 
which market players are used to cooperating on a volun- 
tary basis with the government and among each other.13 
The problem, however, is whether market players are pre- 
pared to compete against each other in the market place, as 
there is a long standing tradition of mutual cooperation 
which is difficult to overcome. By the end of 1995 the 
structure of the industry will be evaluated by the Dutch 
government and by Parliament. At the moment, the out- 
come of preparatory discussions on the choice between the 
two alternatives i  still open. 
Germany 
The German electricity industry fits into the category of full 
coordination. The German federal government has only 
very limited influence over the industry, and this is mainly 
concerned with supporting the present institutional struc- 
ture. The Lginder and municipal authorities have slightly 
more powers of regulation: for example, for ensuring that 
there is sufficient investment in new capacity (the En- 
ergieau./zichtsbehOrde of the L6nder), and for issuing mu- 
13The instability of the Dutch institutional framework is elaborated upon 
in more detail by K~nneke (1995). 
nicipal permits for distribution area franchises. Apart from 
this limited degree of pubic control, voluntary coordination 
between players in the industry clearly dominates, even as 
an additional coordination mechanism. 
Market entrance The market is shared out between players 
in the market by private law contracts which guarantee re- 
gional monopolies ('demarcation contracts'). In addition, 
electricity utilities are required to have a concession for the 
regional or local authorities to conduct business. These 
concessions and demarcation arrangements, which have a 
maximum term of 20 years, close the market against uncon- 
trolled entrance. There are some independent power gener- 
ating companies which receive a fixed retail price for 
electricity delivered to the National Grid, again based on 
private-law contracts. 
Information exchange The exchange of information is vol- 
untary; there is no national system of capacity planning, 
nor are there publicly imposed power pools. Tariffs are 
transparent. 
Contractual relations Contracts are long term, and can be 
classified as forms of bilateral governance. 
Ownership structure The pattern of ownership is diverse; 
mixed private-public ownership dominates, but there are 
also both privately and publicly owned utilities. 
International trade There are no government restrictions 
on international trade, but only the nine biggest producers 
and distributors are active in cross-border trade. 
The institutional structure of the German electricity mar- 
ket is quite stable, having obvious roots in the structure of 
the federal state. Players in the market are largely au- 
tonomous; the regional and federal authorities act mainly to 
support he functioning of the network. On the national 
German and European level there seems to be a political 
preference for a more market oriented structure, but it is not 
clear whether this will lead to the market, rather than the 
network, being the dominant coordination mechanism. It is 
to be expected that the price mechanism will become more 
significant as an additional coordination system, for example 
through the introduction of a tendering system for new gen- 
erating capacity. This might imply that the generation sec- 
tor will increasingly resemble a liberalized coordination 
system, but a shift towards the price mechanism as the dom- 
inant regime would require the application of German anti- 
trust law to the electricity utilities to preclude private-law 
contracts. Although some thought has been given to this, 
the current operating mechanisms within the industry 
would not appear to support such significant changes to the 
institutional structure. 
England and Wales 
In these countries the structure of the electricity industry 
falls into the category of a controlled free market, the dom- 
inant object of government regulation being the market 
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structure. Public regulators are granted the authority to sup- 
port a market structure which allows for a sufficient degree 
of competition. Being natural monopolies, transport and 
distribution are heavily regulated, whereas generation and 
trade are predominately open to price coordinated trans- 
actions. All electricity producers have to sell to an inde- 
pendent pool, from which all suppliers must buy power. 
However, individual 'contracts for different' between pro- 
ducers and suppliers are allowed, and, as there is still a 
group of captive customers, 14prices for these consumers 
are regulated. 
Market entrance Entrance to the electricity generation 
market is subject only to non-discriminatory technical re- 
strictions; however, the publicly owned Nuclear Electric 
enjoys a guarantced market share. The trade in electricity is 
subject to some service and technical obligations, but is 
otherwise freely accessible. 
In[brmation need.; To maintain sufficient market rans- 
parency pool prices are published aily, as are charges for 
using the transmission and distribution system. This 
amounts to a system of compulsory information exchange. 
Contractual relations All activities handled irectly by thc 
pool can be described as market-governed arrangements.15 
However, more than 90% of all electric power transactions 
are hedged by 'contracts for difference'; these contracts 
bind suppliers and producers for a longer period in order to 
reduce the risk of price fluctuation, and can be described as 
'bilateral'. 
Ownership structure The electricity industry is fully priva- 
tized, except for Nuclear Electric.16 
International trade There are no restrictions on interna- 
tional trade, but there are technical difficulties associated 
with the transport of electricity from and to the Continent. 
Besides trade on the British mainland with Scotland, there 
is some trade with France. 
The structure of the electricity industry in England and 
Wales is still evolving, with an obvious political preference 
for a market oriented structure. Liberalization and privat- 
ization were introduced simultaneously, resulting in thc 
need for strong government intervention to ensure a suffi- 
cient degree of competition while guaranteeing a minimum 
standard of service and protection for captive customers. 
The nuclear power industry is an exception ot only be- 
cause it is publicly owned, but also because it has a guaran- 
teed market share. There seems to be the political will to 
develop this industry into a coordinated free market, in 
which the market structure is the main object of govern- 
14It is planned that by 1998 all customers will have flee market access. 
15However, with the pool as an independent third party between buyers 
and sellers, these activities also display some characteristics of trilateral 
governance. 
I¢~Recently. firm plans have been put lbrward to privatize Nuclear Electric. 
ment regulation. However, if this government regulation 
is not effective, it may evolve into a 'liberalized coordina- 
tion' regime in which private sector agreements - either 
formal or informal - determine market entrance, inter- 
national trade, and the exchange of relevant information 
about he market. An effective anti-trust policy is therefore 
badly needed to maintain the market based organizational 
structure. 
El'alice 
The French electricity market is a textbook case of a nearly 
full hierarchy. The dominant object of government reg- 
ulation is the structure and conduct of the industry. The 
central government has a strong position in the industry, 
supporting, initiating and enforcing developments mainly 
in accordance with its own political leanings - the decisive 
introduction of the nuclear power programme being an 
example. 
Under present conditions Electricit6 de France (EDF) 
has a monopoly position, and there are no possibilities for 
third parties to enter the market. International trade is re- 
stricted by government regulation, and the industry is in 
public ownership. Being fully vertically integrated, all vital 
contractual relations are internalized within a unified EDF 
governing body. Owing to the specific structure of the in- 
dustry, the information required by third parties is mainly 
limited to tariffs and service conditions, which are period- 
ically published. The present system can be considered to 
be very stable; the only serious threat seems to be from the 
liberalization movement within the EU. 
Taking into account he French preference for strong 
public control over the electricity industry, the possibilities 
for liberalization will have to be realized within the context 
of public control as the dominant coordination system. De- 
velopment towards a liberalized hierarchy, including some 
price coordination, is to be expected. The French proposal 
for the introduction of a single buyer handling all interna- 
tional trade within the EU would be a step in this direction. 
Conclusion 
In this article we develop a theoretical conceptualization f 
different systems for coordinating industrial activities 
within sectors of the economy. Three pure and six mixed 
coordination systems are identified, and described in more 
detail using additional structural features. The main dis- 
tinguishing factor is the choice of one of three different 
allocation systems (the price mechanism, voluntary agree- 
ment and governmental hierarchical authority) as a dom- 
inant or additional system. Based on this conceptualization, 
it is possible to operationalize the concept of liberalization 
as a change in the dominant or the additional coordination 
system. 
As a second step, we discuss the nature of the relation 
between different modes of industrial organization and dif- 
ferent types of government regulation. In the discussion 
about market reforms, the challenge is to find an optimal 
relationship between liberalization of the organization of 
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the industry and the extent of government regulation. The 
reforms in the electricity industry cannot be dealt with only 
as an economic issue because politicians consider the in- 
dustry to be responsible for certain public tasks. For this 
reason there are limits to liberalization, which strongly de- 
pend upon the degree to which the industry is expected to 
fulfil these public tasks. By considering the optimal na- 
tional structure of the electricity industry in a specific na- 
tional setting, a trade off has to be made between the 
stimulation of economic performance- which might be ex- 
pected to coincide to some extent with liberalization of the 
industry - and carrying out various public tasks requiring 
government intervention. 
By conceptualizing the notion of liberalization, this be- 
comes theoretically distinct from the issue of privatization 
and regulation. As we argue in this article, liberalization 
deals with the choice of a dominant and additional co- 
ordination system. Privatization, as a change of ownership 
structure, is independent ofthis choice. Concerning the reg- 
ulation of the electricity industry to guarantee various pub- 
lic tasks, we discussed above that there is some degree of 
correlation between different ypes of liberalization and 
regulation. It appears that liberalization leads under certain 
circumstances to a greater need for regulation - for ex- 
ample in the England and Wales case. 
As a third step, the classification scheme is illustrated by 
applying it to four countries (the Netherlands, Germany, 
England and Wales, and France). The concept turns out to 
be useful in describing different organizational structures in
the electricity industry, and in specifying the different de- 
grees of liberalization already realized. Different national 
policy priorities are identified, and, as illustrated by the 
four above-mentioned countries it is demonstrated that lib- 
eralization takes on very different meanings in different 
national settings. By taking account of these national ap- 
proaches to organizing the electricity industry, we can as- 
sess future liberalization policies. However, the optimal 
relationship - according to economic standards - between 
liberalization and public involvement can ultimately only 
be answered empirically. 
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